ON ENHANCING THE ROLE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL ORGANS IN THE PEOPLE’S ARMY

A Talk to the Officials of the Organizational Leadership Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army
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The recent plenary meeting of the People’s Army Party Committee is of great significance for the establishment of the Party’s monolithic ideological system within the People’s Army and for ensuring effective Party leadership of the People’s Army and strengthening its combat power. The plenary meeting exposed and criticized the grave crimes committed by the warlord bureaucrats who held responsible positions in the Ministry of National Defence. In the past the warlord bureaucrats weakened the Party’s leadership of the People’s Army, made the special being of the army and failed to accept and implement ideologically the Party’s military line and strategic and tactical policies. Thus they caused great harm to the process of strengthening and developing the People’s Army.

The leader said that in order to expunge the harmful effects of the warlord bureaucrats as soon as possible and strengthen the combat readiness and capacity of the People’s Army, it would be necessary, above all, to enhance the function and role of the Party organizations and political organs and that the Organizational Leadership Department of the Party Central Committee must direct these bodies appropriately.

The most serious of the crimes committed by the warlord bureaucrats in the past was that they paralysed the functioning of the Party organizations and political organs in the People’s Army and weakened the Party’s leadership of the People’s Army. Party leadership is a fundamental question in the building of revolutionary armed forces. Party leadership of the revolutionary army is what keeps it alive. Apart from our Party’s leadership it is inconceivable to train the People’s Army into a reliable defender of the revolution and develop it into a revolutionary force whose members equal a hundred foes each.

Our Party is the general staff of the Korean revolution and the guiding force which leads our people to victory. In our society all political organizations work under the leadership of the Party and only Party leadership firmly guarantees the victory and success of the revolutionary struggle and construction work. The People’s Army cannot be an exception. The People’s Army is the revolutionary armed force of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and its mission is to defend with arms the revolutionary cause of our Party which was pioneered and led by the leader and to implement the Party’s military line. The People’s Army must display loyalty in following
the leadership of the Party and the leader and only then can it honorably fulfill its mission and duty.

Party leadership of the People’s Army is effected through the Party organizations and political organs in the army. However, the warlord bureaucrats weakened the functioning of the Party organizations and political organs in various ways and hindered them from conducting proper political and ideological work among the soldiers. Abusing their authority, they decided all matters arbitrarily and worked in a tyrannical fashion, ignoring the Party organizations and political organs. In the People’s Army all important political and military questions should be discussed in Party committees, but they ignored these regulations, punishing and dismissing cadres at random and reversing the Party’s policy on combat readiness at will. How arbitrarily they ignored Party organizations and how tyrannically they worked is clear from the fact that a commander was allowed to make a concluding speech at a Party meeting and a political bureau was forced to submit a report on Party political work through the staff to a higher level. They not only took control over Party organizations and political organs. They also prevented the general political bureau from developing relations with the Party Central Committee departments concerned and thus rejected the leadership and control of the Party Central Committee.

Such behaviour by the warlord bureaucrats represented an anti-Party manoeuvre intended to make the People’s Army the plaything of an individual and disarm our Party. It differs little from the crimes committed in former days by anti-Party, counter-revolutionary factionalists who attempted to divorce the army from Party leadership and use it to realize their dirty political ambition, claiming that the People’s Army should be ‘an army of the united front’.

In the final analysis the universal militarization idea of the warlord bureaucrats weakened the Party political work in the People’s Army, hindered the implementation of the Party’s military line and damaged the relationship between the army and the people. Such serious mistakes occurred in the People’s Army, the revolutionary armed force of our Party, mainly because the Party organizations and political organs became impotent. Though they knew for certain that the warlord bureaucrats were going against the Party’s line and policy, the Party organizations and political organs in the People’s Army failed to launch a principled campaign against them, cowed by their authority. If the Party organizations and political organs had improved their leadership functioning, trained the members in the Party spirit and conducted a powerful struggle against unsound ideological elements alien to the Party, warlord bureaucracy could not have grown up in the army. We must draw a serious lesson from the shortcomings manifested in the Party political work in the People’s Army and correct them as soon as possible.

Above all the Party organizations and political organs in the army must be made into a living organization which is vigorous and militant in defending and implementing the Party’s line and policy.
It is imperative to reinforce the Party committees and improve their functions and role.

A Party committee is a collective leadership body which organizes and guides the work of implementing the Party's line and policy in the unit concerned.

More than ten years ago the leader established the system of Party committees in all the army so as to prevent individuals from behaving arbitrarily and strengthen the guidance available to the Party life of the military and political cadres. However, because of the arbitrariness of the warlord bureaucrats the Party committees had not been fulfilling their functions and role in recent years. Party committees at all levels in the People's Army must be built up of those who are imbued with the monolithic idea of the Party and possess a strong Party spirit, and their function of collective leadership must be restored within a short space of time.

Our Party ensures its leadership over the revolution and construction work through the collective guidance of Party committees at all levels. Party organizations at all levels from the Party Central Committee to the basic Party organizations are run on the principle of collective leadership, with no exceptions, and work in all fields is carried out under the collective leadership of the Party committee concerned. In the People's Army, too, the Party committee concerned must collectively discuss and decide on the orientations and methods for the implementation of the important political and military tasks that arise at every stage. Military officers must carry out their military tasks and political officers their political tasks according to its decisions each of them being ready to answer to the Party committee. This discipline must be firmly established in the People's Army.

The basic task of the Party organizations is to strengthen guidance to and control over Party members, so that they will lead a conscientious Party life. In order to strengthen Party life among the members, every Party member must be encouraged conscientiously to carry out his duties as laid down in the Party Rules. The Party Rules give a full account of the principled requirements of Party life. There are higher and lower positions in the ranks, but such difference cannot be tolerated in Party life and every member should participate in Party life with the same rights and duties. The standard of Party life is applied equally in all Party organizations, both in civil communities and in the People's Army. However, in the People's Army many officers and generals did not participate conscientiously in Party life, citing the specific nature of the army, and dual discipline was tolerated in Party life. A typical example of such behaviour is that Party members were not allowed to criticize their superior officers at the Party meeting.

Forbidding them to criticize their officers was not for the good of the officers themselves. If they valued and loved the officers sincerely, they should make a strong demand for their Party life and criticize them strictly. Without education and control a man will naturally degenerate. Many officers who were free from the education and
control of the Party in the past lagged behind ideologically, behaved
tautiously and bureaucratically and ultimately committed grave errors.
Most officers currently belong to the hardcore of our Party and the
backbone of the People’s Army, they are men who have served long
in the army and fought bravely during the Fatherland Liberation War.
The Party organizations in the People’s Army should guide their
Party life sincerely so that they will be constantly training themselves
and maintaining a strong Party spirit and revolutionary spirit, thus
remaining loyal to the revolution.
It is imperative to enhance the role of the political organs in the
People’s Army and decisively improve political work.
The power of a revolutionary army is related to its political and
ideological advantages. A revolutionary army can defeat an
imperialist army, not because it is superior militarily and technically,
but because its soldiers fight, with a high level of political and
ideological consciousness, willing to sacrifice themselves. Giving
priority to political work in military affairs, in order to groom the
soldiers firmly on clear political and ideological lines and make the
entire army a single combat unit faithful to the Party; this is the
fundamental principle advanced by the leader for the building of a
revolutionary army.
At present there is a substantial tendency among the cadres of the
People’s Army influenced by the warlord bureaucrats to regard
military orders as all-important and neglect the Party political work.
Such attitudes should be corrected first of all. We should see to it that
commanders clearly know that only when political work is carried
out properly can combat capacity be strengthened and that they offer
political workers sincere help and make efforts to give priority to
political work in the carrying out of military tasks.
In order to improve Party political work in the People’s Army, the
leader has currently posted a commissar to every regiment.
Establishing the commissar system in all army units is the
appropriate measure for implementing the military line and policies
of the Party correctly by enhancing the prestige of the political organs
and improving Party political work.
It is necessary for the cadres of the People’s Army to possess a
correct understanding of the commissar system. I was told that some
commanders ask what distinguishes the commissar from the head of
the political department or the vice-regiment commander in charge of
political affairs who already exist. Their duties and roles are different
from each other. The head of the political department and the vice-
regiment commander in charge of political affairs are Party, political
workers, but they are not representatives of the Party. The commissar
is a representative of the Party dispatched to an army unit. As the
Party and political head of the unit concerned, the commissar is duty
bound to guarantee that the commander works in a proper Party and
political manner. In addition to this, when the commander makes a
decision or issues an order contrary to the Party’s line and policy,
the commissar has the right to reject it and prevent its
implementation. This is a special feature of the commissar system.
Commanders and political workers must be clearly aware of the leader's intentions in posting commissars to regiments and higher levels and they must work faithfully according to his intentions, and allow the commissar system to function to its fullest advantage. Fundamental to the political and ideological strengthening of the People's Army is the firm establishment of the Party's monolithic ideological system. Establishing this system in the People's Army is all the more urgent because the warlord bureaucrats have recently weakened the Party's political work and dealt with many matters in a fashion opposed to the monolithic ideological system of the Party. In order to establish this system firmly, every soldier must be equipped with the revolutionary idea of our Party. The revolutionary idea of our Party is the revolutionary idea of the leader and the Korean revolution draws its sure guidance from this idea. If soldiers are not equipped with the revolutionary idea of the leader, they may degenerate under the influence of unsound ideologies and fail to follow the road of revolution faithfully.

In strengthening education in the monolithic idea among the soldiers, we should make sure that all of them adopt the unshakable point of view that they recognize nothing but the revolutionary idea of the leader. Only when they accept the revolutionary idea of the leader on a basis of unshakable faith, can the soldiers think and move as the leader thinks and intends and fight resolutely in any difficult and complicated situation to defend and implement the Party's line and policy.

We should establish a system for informing soldiers promptly of the leader's teachings and the Party's policy. Without a clear understanding of these teachings and policy soldiers cannot implement them correctly and fight against phenomena which contradict the Party's idea. At present, the People's Army has no proper system for relaying to the soldiers the sound recordings and texts of the leader's instructions and the decisions and instructions of the Party Central Committee. When a meeting to listen to a sound recording of the leader's teaching is organized, for example, the regimental commander has the right to listen to it, but the political vice-regimental commander does not, because the entry is allowed on the basis of military rank. This is a serious mistake, an expression of the military-cadre-first idea. There is no reason why the political vice-regimental commander should not know what the regimental commander knows.

Entry to meetings arranged to listen to sound recordings of the leader's teachings should not be determined according to military rank but according to the importance of the duties, and the decisions and instructions of the Party Central Committee, too, should also be sent to the units and relayed to the soldiers if they are not secret. Only then will the soldiers be well informed of the Party's requirements and the country's situation and carry out their military tasks in a credible fashion.

Defending the Party and the leader politically and ideologically and at
the cost of one’s life is the honourable task of the People’s Army. Under the motto "Let us defend at the cost of our lives the Party Central Committee led by the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung!" the People’s Army must rally all the soldiers rock-firm behind the Party and the leader and establish a command system under which the whole army moves as one under the monolithic leadership of the leader.

Education programmes in Party policy, in revolutionary traditions, class consciousness, socialist patriotism and communist education should be properly conducted among the soldiers so that all of them will develop a character befitting a soldier of the revolutionary army. The revolutionary habit of study must be instilled in the People’s Army. At present our Party demands that all the people study under the motto "The Party, the people and the army must all study!" All the soldiers must study, but the officers more diligently. Only when they study more, can the officers properly arm themselves with the revolutionary idea of our Party and, moreover, play their role effectively as propagandist and educator of Party policy among the other soldiers.

Recently the leader obliged all the cadres of the People’s Army, political officers or military officers, university graduates or not, to study under the one-month-short-course system organized by the Party. This demonstrates a deep concern for the cadres of the People’s Army. The one-month-short-course should be well-organized so that all the cadres in the People’s Army can take part in it without exception and, through this course, study the Party’s line and policies in depth and temper themselves ideologically. A campaign should be launched against bourgeois ideas, revisionism, worship of the great powers, dogmatism and other unsound ideological elements, so as to prevent any tendency opposed to the Party’s monolithic ideological system from appearing in the People’s Army. The failure to accept and carry out the leader’s teachings and Party policy with no question asked, liberalism manifested in a dislike of Party life and violations of military discipline, and warlordism and bureaucracy expressed in the suppression of subordinates by orders and shouting are all expressions of outmoded ideas. If such ideas should germinate, they will greatly hinder the strengthening and development of the People’s Army.

A powerful campaign must be launched to eradicate the evil effects left behind by the warlord bureaucrats. Though the warlord bureaucrats were driven out, there still remain the aftereffects they left in the People’s Army. Unless we launch a campaign against the command-everything idea, the military-everything idea and the bureaucracy spread by the warlords, we cannot fully exploit political and ideological advantages of the People’s Army.

In order to be successful in the struggle to eradicate the harmful effects of warlord bureaucrats, it is necessary to inform the military cadres clearly of the crimes which they committed. Only when their
crimes are fully exposed and their seriousness and aftereffects are known, can those who blindly followed the warlord bureaucrats be awakened and repent of their fault, and other people can also draw the appropriate conclusion.

The leader gave instructions that a struggle to eradicate their harmful effects should be launched with criticism as the main weapon and that people should not be punished at random in an administrative manner. The crimes committed by the warlord bureaucrats are grave, but they were not engaged in any schismatic activity drawing people together. As for those who had curried favour with the warlord bureaucrats and committed other errors, they followed them blindly for fear of them, because they tyrannically abused their authority, or else indulged in bureaucratic imitation of them. That is why the leader said that the warlord bureaucrats exposed and criticized in the recent plenary meeting of the People’s Army Party Committee are different in character from the factionalists who were eliminated in August 1956.

Democracy must be exploited to the full in the ideological struggle to eradicate the harmful effects of the warlord bureaucrats. Those who have committed errors should all be criticized according to Party principle, whether they are generals or officers.

In this struggle the officials of the general political bureau must set an example and take the lead. The aftereffects of the warlord bureaucrats’ activity still affect the general political bureau. In the past many officials of the general political bureau lacked the Party spirit and principles. Their blindness allowed them to serve as best man for the warlord bureaucrats. The aftereffects had a powerful negative influence on Party political work as a whole in the army. The general political bureau is duty bound to organize Party political work in the People’s Army as single whole and in coordinated manner and is accountable to the Party Central Committee for this work. The officials of the general political bureau must always bear in mind the importance of the bureau’s position and duty and they must work conscientiously and with a strong sense of responsibility. As an immediate task, the general political bureau should organize in detail the work of distributing and discussing the documents of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth People’s Army Party Committee. It should keep the cadres and Party members well-informed of the leader’s teachings delivered at the plenary meeting and direct Party organizations to discuss their substantial implementation.

The officials of the general political bureau must correct the errors exposed at the plenary meeting of the People’s Army Party Committee as soon as possible and begin to work briskly in a manner free from old fashions.

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